經(jīng)典TED演講：我們是否主宰自己的決定？

　　I'll tell you a little bit about irrational behavior. Not yours, of course -- other people's. (Laughter)

　　今天我想談?wù)劮抢硇孕袨椤?我當(dāng)然不是指你們的非理性行為，是其他人的。 (笑聲)

　　So after being at MIT for a few years, I realized that writing academic papers is not that exciting. You know, I don't know how many of those you read, but it's not fun to read and often not fun to write -- even worse to write. So I decided to try and write something more fun. And I came up with an idea that I will write a cookbook. And the title for my cookbook was going to be "Dining Without Crumbs: The Art of Eating Over the Sink." (Laughter) And it was going to be a look at life through the kitchen. And I was quite excited about this. I was going to talk a little bit about research, a little bit about the kitchen. You know, we do so much in the kitchen I thought this would be interesting. And I wrote a couple of chapters. And I took it to MIT press and they said, "Cute, but not for us. Go and find somebody else." I tried other people and everybody said the same thing, "Cute. Not for us."

　　在MIT (麻省理工學(xué)院)待了幾年之后， 我發(fā)覺(jué)寫學(xué)術(shù)論文并不怎樣叫人興奮。 我不知道有多少學(xué)術(shù)論文會(huì)有人看, 不過(guò)讀學(xué)術(shù)文章并不十分有趣，很多時(shí)寫學(xué)術(shù)文章也沒(méi)有什么趣味， 其實(shí)寫比讀更糟。 所以我決定寫一些較好玩的東西。 我有一個(gè)主意——我想寫一本烹飪書。 這本烹飪書的名字將會(huì)是 “沒(méi)有碎屑的晚餐：在洗碗糟上吃飯的藝術(shù)” (笑聲) 這本書會(huì)從廚房看人生。 這個(gè)計(jì)劃令我很興奮， 我打算在這本書里一方面寫研究，一方面寫廚房。 你知啦，我們?cè)趶N房做那么多的事，我想這本書會(huì)很有趣。 于是我寫了幾個(gè)章， 跟著把書拿到MIT出版社， 但他們說(shuō)： “很有趣，不過(guò)不適合我們， 你找其他人吧。” 我又把書拿給其他人看，但他們說(shuō)的全都一樣： “很有趣，不過(guò)不適合我們。”

　　Until somebody said, "Look, if you're serious about this, you first have to write a book about your research. You have to publish something, and then you'll get the opportunity to write something else. If you really want to do it you have to do it." So I said, "You know, I really don't want to write about my research. I do this all day long. I want to write something else. Something a bit more free, less constrained." And this person was very forceful and said, "Look. That's the only way you'll ever do it." So I said, "Okay, if I have to do it -- " I had a sabbatical. I said, "I'll write about my research if there is no other way. And then I'll get to do my cookbook." So I wrote a book on my research.

　　最后有人說(shuō)： “看，如果你是認(rèn)真的話， 你必須先寫一本關(guān)于你的研究的書 ，你一定要發(fā)表什么， 才會(huì)得到寫其他東西的機(jī)會(huì)。 如果你真的要出版這本書，就一定得這樣做。” 我說(shuō)：“我真的不想寫跟我的研究有關(guān)的書， 我一整天都做研究，我想寫一些其他的東西， 一些比較自由，不那么拘緊的東西。” 這個(gè)人很堅(jiān)定地說(shuō)： “如果你要達(dá)到目的，這是唯一的方法。” 于是我說(shuō)：“好吧，如果真的一定要這樣做——” 我有一個(gè)學(xué)術(shù)休假，我對(duì)自己說(shuō): “如果沒(méi)有其他方法， 我只好先寫我的研究，然后再寫我的烹飪書。” 于是我寫了一本關(guān)于我的研究的書。

　　And it turned out to be quite fun in two ways. First of all, I enjoyed writing. But the more interesting thing was that I started learning from people. It's a fantastic time to write, because there is so much feedback you can get from people. People write me about their personal experience, and about their examples, and what they disagree, and nuances. And even being here -- I mean the last few days, I've known really heights of obsessive behavior I never thought about. (Laughter) Which I think is just fascinating.

　　寫完后，我發(fā)覺(jué)其實(shí)寫這本書也挺有趣。 這可以分開(kāi)兩方面來(lái)說(shuō)。 首先，我喜歡寫作， 但更有趣的是， 我開(kāi)始向其他人學(xué)習(xí)。 寫作的過(guò)程很棒， 因?yàn)橛性S多人給你回應(yīng)。 他們給我寫自己的個(gè)人經(jīng)歷， 告訴我他們的例子，和不同意我的地方， 還有很多精細(xì)的見(jiàn)解。 也就是在這兒，我是指過(guò)去幾天， 我才見(jiàn)識(shí)到人們對(duì)事物著迷 竟然可以達(dá)到那種程度， (笑聲) 使我大開(kāi)眼界。

　　I will tell you a little bit about irrational behavior. And I want to start by giving you some examples of visual illusion as a metaphor for rationality. So think about these two tables. And you must have seen this illusion. If I asked you what's longer, the vertical line on the table on the left, or the horizontal line on the table on the right? Which one seems longer? Can anybody see anything but the left one being longer? No, right? It's impossible. But the nice thing about visual illusion is we can easily demonstrate mistakes. So I can put some lines on; it doesn't help. I can animate the lines. And to the extent you believe I didn't shrink the lines, which I didn't, I've proven to you that your eyes were deceiving you. Now, the interesting thing about this is when I take the lines away, it's as if you haven't learned anything in the last minute. (Laughter) You can't look at this and say, "Okay now I see reality as it is." Right? It's impossible to overcome this sense that this is indeed longer. Our intuition is really fooling us in a repeatable, predictable, consistent way. And there is almost nothing we can do about it, aside from taking a ruler and starting to measure it.

　　讓我們談?wù)劮抢硇孕袨椤?首先我想你們看看幾個(gè)視覺(jué)錯(cuò)覺(jué)的例子， 作為理性錯(cuò)覺(jué)的一個(gè)比喻。 請(qǐng)看看這兩張臺(tái)子， 你一定見(jiàn)過(guò)這個(gè)錯(cuò)覺(jué)。 如果我問(wèn)你，左邊桌子的垂直長(zhǎng)度較長(zhǎng)， 還是右邊桌子的水平長(zhǎng)度較長(zhǎng)? 那一條線看來(lái)比較長(zhǎng)? 是不是每個(gè)人都看見(jiàn)左邊那條線較長(zhǎng)， 有沒(méi)有看到別的? 沒(méi)有人看到別的，對(duì)不對(duì)?沒(méi)有可能看到別的。 視覺(jué)錯(cuò)覺(jué)的美妙之處，是我們很容易證明錯(cuò)誤。 我可以加一些線在這里，不過(guò)沒(méi)有什么用處。 我可以移動(dòng)這些線， 只要你相信我沒(méi)有縮短它們， 而我確實(shí)沒(méi)有，我就能證明你們的眼睛欺騙了你。 視覺(jué)錯(cuò)覺(jué)的有趣之處， 是如果我把這些線移走， 那便好像你在剛才一分鐘什么也沒(méi)有學(xué)到。 (笑聲) 你不能看著這圖說(shuō)，“哦，我現(xiàn)在看到真實(shí)的圖像了。” 對(duì)不對(duì)?要克服這個(gè)錯(cuò)覺(jué)是不可能的， 我們還是覺(jué)得這條線較長(zhǎng)。 我們的直覺(jué)總是重復(fù)地，可預(yù)測(cè)地，屢試不爽地欺騙我們， 而我們卻幾乎沒(méi)有什么辦法， 只能拿一把尺量一量?jī)H此而已。

　　Here is another one -- this is one of my favorite illusions. What do you see the color that top arrow is pointing to? Brown. Thank you. The bottom one? Yellow. Turns out they're identical. Can anybody see them as identical? Very very hard. I can cover the rest of the cube up. And if I cover the rest of the cube you can see that they are identical. And if you don't believe me you can get the slide later and do some arts and crafts and see that they're identical. But again it's the same story that if we take the background away, the illusion comes back. Right. There is no way for us not to see this illusion. I guess maybe if you're colorblind I don't think you can see that. I want you to think about illusion as a metaphor.

　　這是另一個(gè)例子。是我最喜歡的視覺(jué)錯(cuò)覺(jué)之一。 你見(jiàn)到上方箭頭指著的是什么顏色? 棕色，謝謝你。 下面這個(gè)呢?黃色。 其實(shí)它們是完全一樣的。 有人看見(jiàn)它們是一樣的嗎? 非常非常難。 我可以把方塊的其他部分蓋住， 如果我把方塊其他部分蓋住，你可以看見(jiàn)它們其實(shí)是一樣的。 如果你不相信我， 一會(huì)兒你可以向我要投影片， 把圖像剪剪貼貼，看他們是否真的一樣。 不過(guò)，跟第一個(gè)例子一樣， 只要我們把背景除掉， 我們的錯(cuò)覺(jué)又回來(lái)了，對(duì)不對(duì)? 我們沒(méi)有辦法不受這個(gè)錯(cuò)覺(jué)影響。 或者如果有人是色盲的話，才可能會(huì)看不到。 我想大家把視覺(jué)錯(cuò)覺(jué)看成一個(gè)比喻。

　　Vision is one of the best things we do. We have a huge part of our brain dedicated to vision -- bigger than dedicated to anything else. We do more vision more hours of the day than we do anything else. And we are evolutionarily designed to do vision. And if we have these predictable repeatable mistakes in vision, which we're so good at, what's the chance that we don't make even more mistakes in something we're not as good at -- for example, financial decision making: (Laughter) something we don't have an evolutionary reason to do, we don't have a specialized part of the brain, and we don't do that many hours of the day. And the argument is in those cases it might be the issue that we actually make many more mistakes and, worse, not have an easy way to see them. Because in visual illusions we can easily demonstrate the mistakes; in cognitive illusion it's much, much harder to demonstrate to people the mistakes.

　　視覺(jué)是我們最出色的能力之一， 我們大腦的很大部分是專用于視力的， 比用作其他能力的部分都大。 我們一天里運(yùn)用視覺(jué)的時(shí)數(shù)，要比用在其他事情的時(shí)數(shù)多。 人類的進(jìn)化使我們長(zhǎng)于視力。 如果我們的視覺(jué)也有這些可預(yù)測(cè)的，可重復(fù)的錯(cuò)誤， 而視覺(jué)是我們最優(yōu)秀的能力之一， 至于我們不那么優(yōu)秀的能力， 我們不會(huì)犯更多錯(cuò)誤的機(jī)會(huì)又有多少? 舉一個(gè)例子，我們金融決策的訂定。 (笑聲) 一些我們沒(méi)有一個(gè)演化原因會(huì)做得好的事情; 一些在大腦中沒(méi)有專責(zé)部分處理的事情; 一些我們?cè)谝惶炖�，不是花那么多時(shí)間做的事情。 我們要問(wèn)的，就是在這些事情上 我們會(huì)否犯上更多的錯(cuò)誤。 更糟的是，要認(rèn)識(shí)到這些錯(cuò)誤并不容易。 在視覺(jué)錯(cuò)覺(jué)上，我們很容易證明錯(cuò)誤; 可是要向人們證明他們認(rèn)知上的錯(cuò)覺(jué)， 卻非常艱難。

　　So I want to show you some cognitive illusions, or decision-making illusions, in the same way. And this is one of my favorite plots in social sciences. It's from a paper by Johnson and Goldstein. And it basically shows the percentage of people who indicated they would be interested in giving their organs to donation. And these are different countries in Europe. And you basically see two types of countries: countries on the right, that seem to be giving a lot; and countries on the left that seem to giving very little, or much less. The question is, why? Why do some countries give a lot and some countries give a little?

　　所以我想讓大家看一些認(rèn)知錯(cuò)覺(jué)的例子， 和人們做決定時(shí)， 與認(rèn)知誤差有關(guān)的錯(cuò)覺(jué)。 這是我在社會(huì)科學(xué)中，最喜愛(ài)的圖表之一。 取自Johnson 和Goldstein 的一篇文章。 圖表基本上顯示 表示有興趣捐贈(zèng)器官人士 的百分比。 這些是歐洲的各個(gè)國(guó)家�；�本上 你可以見(jiàn)到兩類國(guó)家： 右邊的國(guó)家很多人表示愿意捐贈(zèng)器官， 而左邊的國(guó)家就很少人愿意， 比右邊少得多。 問(wèn)題時(shí)，為什么有些國(guó)家有那么多人愿意捐贈(zèng)器官， 而有些國(guó)家愿意的人是那么少?

　　When you ask people this question, they usually think that it has to be something about culture. Right? How much do you care about people? Giving your organs to somebody else is probably about how much you care about society, how linked you are. Or maybe it is about religion. But, if you look at this plot, you can see that countries that we think about as very similar actually exhibit very different behavior. For example, Sweden is all the way on the right, and Denmark, that we think is culturally very similar, is all the way on the left. Germany is on the left. And Austria is on the right. The Netherlands is on the left. And Belgium is on the right. And finally, depending on your particular version of European similarity, you can think about the U.K and France as either similar culturally or not. But it turns out that from organ donation they are very different.

　　如果你問(wèn)別人這個(gè)問(wèn)題， 他們多數(shù)都會(huì)以為和文化有關(guān)。 對(duì)不對(duì)?你有多關(guān)心其他人? 捐贈(zèng)器官給其他人， 大概跟一個(gè)人是否關(guān)心社會(huì)，和其他人的關(guān)系有多密切有關(guān)， 又或者和宗教有關(guān)。 不過(guò)，如果你看看這個(gè)圖表， 你會(huì)看到，我們以為很相似的國(guó)家， 實(shí)際上卻表現(xiàn)出非常不同的行為。 例如，瑞典在圖表的最右方， 但我們認(rèn)為和瑞典很相近的丹麥， 卻在圖表的最左方; 德國(guó)在左方，但奧地利卻在右方; 荷蘭在左方，而比利時(shí)就在右方; 最后，視乎你對(duì)歐洲各國(guó) 的相近性的看法， 你可能會(huì)以為英國(guó)和法國(guó)的文化是互相接近或者不同， 不過(guò)，就器官捐贈(zèng)比例來(lái)說(shuō)，他們卻顯著不同。

　　By the way, the Netherlands is an interesting story. You see the Netherlands is kind of the biggest of the small group. Turns out that they got to 28 percent after mailing every household in the country a letter begging people to join this organ donation program. You know the expression, "Begging only gets you so far"? It's 28 percent in organ donation.

　　順便說(shuō)說(shuō)，關(guān)于荷蘭有一個(gè)有趣的故事。 你可以看到，荷蘭是少人捐贈(zèng)器官的國(guó)家之中比例最高的。 真相是，有百分之二十八的人 在收到一封寄到全國(guó)每一戶的信， 懇求人們參加器官捐贈(zèng)計(jì)劃以后， 表示愿意這么做。 你聽(tīng)過(guò)一句話沒(méi)有：“乞求不會(huì)有什么好效果。” 在器官捐贈(zèng)上，就只能達(dá)到百分之二十八。

　　(Laughter)

　　(笑聲)

　　But whatever the countries on the right are doing they are doing a much better job than begging. So what are they doing? Turns out the secret has to do with a form at the DMV. And here is the story. The countries on the left have a form at the DMV that looks something like this. Check the box below if you want to participate in the organ donor program. And what happens? People don't check, and they don't join. The countries on the right, the ones that give a lot, have a slightly different form. It says check the box below if you don't want to participate. Interestingly enough, when people get this, they again don't check -- but now they join.

　　反之，無(wú)論右方的國(guó)家做了什么， 他們的成效都比乞求人們好。 那究竟這些國(guó)家做了什么? 原來(lái)他們的秘密，在于汽車登記處的一張表格。 這便是他們所做的。 在圖表左方的國(guó)家，汽車登記處的表格包括了 這個(gè)部分： 愿意參加器官捐贈(zèng)計(jì)劃者， 請(qǐng)?jiān)诜礁翊蚬础?結(jié)果怎么樣? 多數(shù)人沒(méi)有打勾，他們沒(méi)有參加捐贈(zèng)計(jì)劃。 圖表右方的國(guó)家，那些參加捐贈(zèng)計(jì)劃比例很高的國(guó)家， 則用了一張不同的表格， 上面寫著，不愿意參加器官捐贈(zèng)計(jì)劃者，請(qǐng)?jiān)诜礁翊蚬础?有趣的是，人們拿著這一張表格， 他們也不打勾， 不過(guò)這么一來(lái)，他們參加了器官捐贈(zèng)計(jì)劃。

　　(Laughter)

　　(笑聲)

　　Now think about what this means. We wake up in the morning and we feel we make decisions. We wake up in the morning and we open the closet and we feel that we decide what to wear. And we open the refrigerator and we feel that we decide what to eat. What this is actually saying is that much of these decisions are not residing within us. They are residing in the person who is designing that form. When you walk into the DMV, the person who designed the form will have a huge influence on what you'll end up doing. Now it's also very hard to intuit these results. Think about it for yourself. How many of you believe that if you went to renew your license tomorrow, and you went to the DMV, and you would encounter one of these forms, that it would actually change your own behavior? Very, very hard to think that you will influence us. We can say, "Oh, these funny Europeans, of course it would influence them." But when it comes to us, we have such a feeling that we are at the driver's seat, we have such a feeling that we are in control, and we are making the decision, that it's very hard to even accept the idea that we actually have an illusion of making a decision, rather than an actual decision.

　　讓我們想想，這告訴我們什么? 我們?cè)缟掀饋?lái)，覺(jué)得可以主宰自己的決定， 我們?cè)缟掀饋?lái)，打開(kāi)衣櫥， 以為我們可以決定穿什么， 打開(kāi)冰箱，以為我們可以決定吃什么， 但我們剛才看到的， 是器官捐贈(zèng)這個(gè)決定，很大程度上并不在乎我們， 反而在乎設(shè)計(jì)表格的人。 當(dāng)你走進(jìn)汽車登記處， 設(shè)計(jì)表格的人將會(huì)對(duì)你跟著要做的事 產(chǎn)生非常重大的影響。 要知道單憑直覺(jué)去找出這些結(jié)果非常困難。試想想我們自己， 你們之中有多少人相信， 如果明天你要為你的汽車?yán)m(xù)牌， 你走進(jìn)汽車登記處， 拿起這些表格時(shí)， 它們真的可以改變你的行為? 要相信它們會(huì)影響我們非常困難。 我們會(huì)說(shuō)，“噢，那些奇怪的歐洲人，他們當(dāng)然會(huì)受到影響。” 不過(guò)如果是我們的話， 我們總是覺(jué)得，我們才是坐在駕駛席的那個(gè)人， 我們總是覺(jué)得，一切在我們掌握之中， 我們主宰自己的決定。 我們很難接受 我們做決定只是一種錯(cuò)覺(jué)， 實(shí)質(zhì)上決定并不是我們做的。

　　Now, you might say, "These are decisions we don't care about." In fact, by definition, these are decisions about something that will happen to us after we die. How could we care about something less than something that happens after we die? So a standard economist, someone who believes in rationality, would say, "You know what? The cost of lifting the pencil and marking a V is higher than the possible benefit of the decision, so that's why we get this effect." But, in fact, it's not because it's easy. It's not because it's trivial. It's not because we don't care. It's the opposite. It's because we care. It's difficult and it's complex. And it's so complex that we don't know what to do. And because we have no idea what to do we just pick whatever it was that was chosen for us.

　　可能你會(huì)說(shuō)， “這些都是我們不在意的決定。” 事實(shí)上，按照定義，這些決定只是 跟我們死后的事情有關(guān)， 有什么事情， 比我們死后的事情更無(wú)關(guān)重要? 所以一個(gè)典型的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家、一個(gè)相信人是理性的人會(huì)說(shuō)， “你知道嗎?提起鉛筆打一個(gè)勾所付出的代價(jià)， 要比做這個(gè)決定 可能帶來(lái)的利益大。" 這就是為什么我們得到這個(gè)結(jié)果。 不過(guò)，事實(shí)上，人們這樣做并不是因?yàn)檫@個(gè)決定太容易， 不是因?yàn)檫@個(gè)決定不重要，不是因?yàn)槲覀儾辉谝狻?剛好相反，人們這樣做是因?yàn)槲覀冊(cè)谝猓?因?yàn)檫@個(gè)決定既困難又復(fù)雜。 這個(gè)決定太復(fù)雜，以致我們不知道該做什么， 我們不知道該怎么做， 于是我們挑了別人預(yù)先為我們選的， 不管哪是什么。

　　I'll give you one more example for this. This is from a paper by Redelmeier and Schaefer. And they said, "Well, this effect also happens to experts, people who are well-paid, experts in their decisions, do it a lot." And they basically took a group of physicians. And they presented to them a case study of a patient. Here is a patient. He is a 67-year-old farmer. He's been suffering from a right hip pain for a while. And then they said to the physician, "You decided a few weeks ago that nothing is working for this patient. All these medications, nothing seems to be working. So you refer the patient to hip replacement therapy. Hip replacement. Okay?" So the patient is on a path to have his hip replaced. And then they said to half the physicians, they said, "Yesterday you reviewed the patient's case and you realized that you forgot to try one medication. You did not try ibuprofen. What do you do? Do you pull the patient back and try ibuprofen? Or do you let them go and have hip replacement?" Well the good news is that most physicians in this case decided to pull the patient and try the ibuprofen. Very good for the physicians.

　　讓我多給你一個(gè)例子。 這個(gè)例子取自Redelmeier 和Schaefer 的一篇文章。 他們說(shuō)：“這種現(xiàn)象也一樣影響專家， 高薪人士、專家做決定時(shí)， 也常常受到錯(cuò)覺(jué)的影響。” 簡(jiǎn)單來(lái)說(shuō)，Redelmeier 和Schaefer找來(lái)一班醫(yī)生， 告訴他們一個(gè)病人的個(gè)案。 病者是一個(gè)農(nóng)夫，六十七歲， 右髖骨已經(jīng)疼了一段時(shí)期。 接著他們對(duì)這班醫(yī)生說(shuō)， 幾星期前，你決定 已經(jīng)沒(méi)有什么療法對(duì)這個(gè)病人有效， 所有藥物似乎都沒(méi)有效果， 所以你決定轉(zhuǎn)介病人 接受髖關(guān)節(jié)置換手術(shù)。 所以，這個(gè)病人已經(jīng)開(kāi)始輪候置換髖關(guān)節(jié)。 跟著他們對(duì)其中一半的醫(yī)生說(shuō)： 你昨天再詳閱病人的個(gè)案， 發(fā)現(xiàn)忘了試一種藥物， 你還沒(méi)有試 ibuprofen(鎮(zhèn)痛消炎藥)。 你會(huì)怎么做呢?你會(huì)不會(huì)召回病人，把ibuprofen 開(kāi)給他試試? 還是讓他繼續(xù)輪候髖關(guān)節(jié)手術(shù)? 好消息是，大部分醫(yī)生都決定 把病人召回，讓他試試 ibuprofen。 我們都很高興醫(yī)生這樣做。

　　The other group of the physicians, they said, "Yesterday when you reviewed the case you discovered there were two medications you didn't try out yet, ibuprofen and piroxicam." And they said, "You have two medications you didn't try out yet. What do you do? You let them go. Or you pull them back. And if you pull them back do you try ibuprofen or piroxicam? Which one?" Now think of it. This decision makes it as easy to let the patient continue with hip replacement. But pulling them back, all of the sudden becomes more complex. There is one more decision. What happens now? Majority of the physicians now choose to let the patient go to hip replacement. I hope this worries you, by the way -- (Laughter) when you go to see your physician. The thing is is that no physician would ever say, "Piroxicam, ibuprofen, hip replacement. Let's go for hip replacement." But the moment you set this as the default it has a huge power over whatever people end up doing.

　　至于另一組醫(yī)生，研究人員對(duì)他們說(shuō)， “你昨天再詳閱病人的個(gè)案， 發(fā)現(xiàn)還沒(méi)有試兩種藥物， 就是ibuprofen和piroxicam。” 研究人員說(shuō)：“你還有兩種藥物沒(méi)有試，你會(huì)怎么做? 你會(huì)讓病人繼續(xù)輪候做手術(shù)， 還是叫他回來(lái)? 如果你叫他回來(lái)，你會(huì)先試ibuprofen 還是 piroxicam? 試想想，這個(gè)決定可以很容易， 就是讓病人繼續(xù)輪候髖關(guān)節(jié)置換手術(shù)。 不過(guò)如果叫他們回來(lái)，突然間決定就變得比較復(fù)雜， 因?yàn)檫�有一個(gè)決定要做。 結(jié)果是怎么樣呢? 大部分醫(yī)生決定讓病人繼續(xù)輪候做手術(shù)， 把髖關(guān)節(jié)換掉。 我希望這個(gè)例子會(huì)使你關(guān)注， (笑聲) 當(dāng)你下次去見(jiàn)醫(yī)生的時(shí)候。 問(wèn)題時(shí)，沒(méi)有一個(gè)醫(yī)生會(huì)說(shuō)： “Piroxicam，ibuprofen 和髖關(guān)節(jié)置換手術(shù)三者之間， 就選擇髖關(guān)節(jié)置換手術(shù)吧。 不過(guò)，一旦你把它設(shè)定作為先決的選擇， 便會(huì)對(duì)人們最后的決定，產(chǎn)生巨大的影響力。

　　I'll give you a couple of more examples on irrational decision-making. Imagine I give you a choice. Do you want to go for a weekend to Rome? All expenses paid: hotel, transportation, food, breakfast, a continental breakfast, everything. Or a weekend in Paris? Now, a weekend in Paris, a weekend in Rome, these are different things; they have different food, different culture, different art. Now imagine I added a choice to the set that nobody wanted. Imagine I said, "A weekend in Rome, a weekend in Paris, or having your car stolen?" (Laughter) It's a funny idea, because why would having your car stolen, in this set, influence anything? (Laughter) But what if the option to have your car stolen was not exactly like this. What if it was a trip to Rome, all expenses paid, transportation, breakfast, but doesn't include coffee in the morning. If you want coffee you have to pay for it yourself. It's two euros 50. Now in some ways, given that you can have Rome with coffee, why would you possibly want Rome without coffee? It's like having your car stolen. It's an inferior option. But guess what happened. The moment you add Rome without coffee, Rome with coffee becomes more popular. And people choose it. The fact that you have Rome without coffee makes Rome with coffee look superior, and not just to Rome without coffee -- even superior to Paris. (Laughter)

　　讓我多舉幾個(gè)例子，證明我們的決定可以是不理性的。 如果我給你一個(gè)選擇， 你可以選到羅馬度周末， 費(fèi)用全免， 包括酒店、交通、膳食、早餐， 歐陸早餐等一切費(fèi)用; 或者到巴黎度周末。 請(qǐng)想想，到巴黎度周末，跟到羅馬度周末，是兩碼子的事。 它們有不同的食物、不同的文化、不同的藝術(shù)。 如果我在這兩者之間， 加上一個(gè)沒(méi)有人喜歡的選擇， 如果我說(shuō)：“你喜歡到羅馬度周末， 到巴黎度周末，還是被人偷車?“ (笑聲) 這是一個(gè)可笑的主意，加上“被人偷車”這個(gè)選擇， 能對(duì)最后決定有什么影響? (笑聲) 不過(guò)如果這個(gè)額外的選擇， 并不是“被人偷車”那又如何? 如果這個(gè)額外的選擇，是到羅馬度周末，費(fèi)用全免， 包括交通、早餐， 但不包括早晨的咖啡。 你要咖啡，便要自掏腰包，付兩歐元的價(jià)錢。 在某程度來(lái)說(shuō)， 既然你可以到”羅馬包咖啡”， 有誰(shuí)會(huì)選擇“到羅馬不包咖啡”呢? 就好像“被人偷車”一樣，那是一個(gè)次等的選擇。 你猜猜結(jié)果怎麼樣?結(jié)果是，你一加上“到羅馬不包咖啡”這個(gè)選擇， “到羅馬包咖啡”就變得較吸引，變成人們的選擇。 “到羅馬不包咖啡”這個(gè)選擇 令人覺(jué)得“到羅馬包咖啡”這個(gè)選擇比其他好， 不單比“到羅馬不包咖啡”好，甚至比到巴黎好。 (笑聲)

　　Here are two examples of this principle. This was an ad from The Economist a few years ago that gave us three choices. An online subscription for 59 dollars. A print subscription for 125. Or you could get both for 125. (Laughter) Now I looked at this and I called up The Economist. And I tried to figure out what were they thinking. And they passed me from one person to another to another, until eventually I got to a person who was in charge of the website. And I called them up. And they went to check what was going on. The next thing I know, the ad is gone. And no explanation.

　　關(guān)于這個(gè)原則我還有兩個(gè)例子。 這是“經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人”雜志幾年前的一則廣告， 他給你三個(gè)選擇： 以五十九元訂閱“經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人”網(wǎng)上版; 以一百二十五元訂閱印刷版; 或是以一百二十五元同時(shí)訂閱印刷版和網(wǎng)上版。 (笑聲) 見(jiàn)到這則廣告后，我致電“經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人”， 我想知道他們是怎樣想的。 他們把我從一個(gè)人交到另一個(gè)人再交到另一個(gè)人， 最后我被轉(zhuǎn)到網(wǎng)頁(yè)的負(fù)責(zé)人， 于是我打電話給他們，他們又說(shuō)要去轉(zhuǎn)問(wèn)其他人。 接著我所知道的，是廣告很快便消失了，沒(méi)有什么解釋。

　　So I decided to do the experiment that I would have loved The Economist to do with me. I took this and I gave it to 100 MIT students. I said, "What would you choose?" These are the market share. Most people wanted the combo deal. Thankfully nobody wanted the dominated option. That means our students can read. (Laughter) But now if you have an option that nobody wants, you can take it off. Right? So I printed another version of this, where I eliminated the middle option. I gave it to another 100 students. Here is what happens. Now the most popular option became the least popular. And the least popular became the most popular.

　　我于是決定自己進(jìn)行 這個(gè)我本來(lái)打算和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人一起做的實(shí)驗(yàn)。 我把廣告給一百個(gè)MIT 個(gè)學(xué)生看， 我說(shuō)，“你會(huì)怎么選?” 這是各個(gè)選擇的占有率 – 多數(shù)人都選擇合拼訂閱計(jì)劃。 沒(méi)有人選擇主流的印刷版， 那顯示我們學(xué)生的閱讀能力還不錯(cuò)。 (笑聲) 不過(guò)既然有一個(gè)選擇完全沒(méi)有人選， 我們應(yīng)該可以把它拿走了吧? 于是我把訂閱表格修改了一下， 把第二個(gè)選擇移走， 再交給另外一百個(gè)學(xué)生選。結(jié)果在這里。 這次最受歡迎的選擇變成最不受歡迎， 而最不受歡迎的卻變成最受歡迎。

　　What was happening was the option that was useless, in the middle, was useless in the sense that nobody wanted it. But it wasn't useless in the sense that it helped people figure out what they wanted. In fact, relative to the option in the middle, which was get only the print for 125, the print and web for 125 looked like a fantastic deal. And as a consequence, people chose it. The general idea here, by the way, is that we actually don't know our preferences that well. And because we don't know our preferences that well we're susceptible to all of these influences from the external forces: the defaults, the particular options that are presented to us, and so on.

　　我們發(fā)現(xiàn)中間那個(gè)選擇， 因?yàn)闆](méi)有人選它，所以可算是一個(gè)沒(méi)有用的選擇， 但事實(shí)上它又不是真正沒(méi)用， 因?yàn)樗�能幫助人們找出他們想要的東西。 事實(shí)上，與中間那個(gè)選擇相比， 即是以一百二十五塊凈訂閱印刷版， 以一百二十五塊一并得到印刷版和網(wǎng)上版看來(lái)十分劃算， 于是，人人都選了它。 這些例子告訴我們， 我們對(duì)自己的喜好其實(shí)并不那么清楚， 而正因?yàn)槲覀儾磺宄�知道自己的喜好�?我們很容易受到各種外在因素的影響, 例如那個(gè)是預(yù)設(shè)的選擇，提供給我們的是那幾個(gè)選擇，等等。

　　One more example of this. People believe that when we deal with physical attraction, we see somebody, and we know immediately whether we like them or not, attracted or not. Which is why we have these four-minute dates. So I decided to do this experiment with people. I'll show you graphic images of people -- not real people. The experiment was with people. I showed some people a picture of Tom, and a picture of Jerry. I said "Who do you want to date? Tom or Jerry?" But for half the people I added an ugly version of Jerry. I took Photoshop and I made Jerry slightly less attractive. (Laughter) The other people, I added an ugly version of Tom. And the question was, will ugly Jerry and ugly Tom help their respective, more attractive brothers? The answer was absolutely yes. When ugly Jerry was around, Jerry was popular. When ugly Tom was around, Tom was popular.

　　這里還有另一個(gè)例子。 一般人相信說(shuō)到外表吸引力， 只要我們可以見(jiàn)到對(duì)方，便可以立即知道自己是否喜歡這個(gè)人， 他或她對(duì)自己是否有吸引力。 這就是為什么我們有那些四分鐘約會(huì)。 于是我決定找人做這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)。 我這里有幾個(gè)人面的圖像 – 他們都不是真人。 再找來(lái)一些做這個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)。 我給他們看兩幅圖像，一幅是Tom, 一幅是Jerry。 我問(wèn)他們：“你們喜歡跟誰(shuí)約會(huì)，是Tom 還是Jerry?” 不過(guò)，對(duì)其中一半人，我加上了一個(gè)丑化了的Jerry 的圖像， 我用Photoshop 加工圖像，把Jerry 弄得沒(méi)有那么具吸引力。 (笑聲) 對(duì)另外一半人，我加了一個(gè)丑化了的 Tom 的圖像。 我的問(wèn)題是，丑化了的 Jerry 和Tom， 會(huì)不會(huì)教原來(lái)的 Jerry 和Tom 變得更具吸引力? 答案是絕對(duì)的。 當(dāng)加上了丑Jerry，原來(lái)的Jerry就變得較受歡迎; 當(dāng)加上了丑Tom，原來(lái)的Tom也變得較受歡迎。

　　(Laughter)

　　(笑聲)

　　This of course has two very clear implications for life in general. If you ever go bar hopping, who do you want to take with you? (Laughter) You want a slightly uglier version of yourself. (Laughter) Similar. Similar ... but slightly uglier. (Laughter) The second point, or course, is that if somebody else invites you, you know how they think about you. (Laughter) Now you're getting it.

　　這個(gè)結(jié)果對(duì)于我們?nèi)粘５纳�活�?有兩個(gè)很清楚的啟示。 如果你要到酒吧留連，你會(huì)跟誰(shuí)一起去? (笑聲) 你會(huì)想要一個(gè)樣子沒(méi)有你那么帥的伴兒。 (笑聲) 和你相似，但比你丑一點(diǎn)兒的。 (笑聲) 當(dāng)然，第二點(diǎn)就是 如果有人請(qǐng)你去酒吧，你就知道他們對(duì)你的看法。 (笑聲) 你們現(xiàn)在明白了吧。

　　What is the general point? The general point is that when we think about economics we have this beautiful view of human nature. "What a piece of work is man! How noble in reason!" We have this view of ourselves, of others. The behavioral economics perspective is slightly less generous to people. In fact in medical terms, that's our view. (Laughter) But there is a silver lining. The silver lining is, I think, kind of the reason that behavioral economics is interesting and exciting. Are we Superman? Or are we Homer Simpson?

　　這些例子總的來(lái)說(shuō)表明了什么? 在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)里，對(duì)于人的本質(zhì) 有著很美麗的看法。 “人類是一件多么了不得的杰作!多么高貴的理性!“(選自莎士比亞“王子復(fù)仇記”) 我們也是這樣看待自己和其他人。 不過(guò)，用行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的角度， 對(duì)人的看法卻沒(méi)有那么美好， 事實(shí)上，借用醫(yī)學(xué)的語(yǔ)言，這便是行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)對(duì)人的看法。 (笑聲) 不過(guò)這也未嘗沒(méi)有一點(diǎn)好處， 我認(rèn)為這點(diǎn)好處， 正是為什么行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)是那么有趣和刺激的原因。 我們到底是超人還是 Homer Simpson (美國(guó)電視劇的主角，以平凡愚笨見(jiàn)稱)?

　　When it comes to building the physical world, we kind of understand our limitations. We build steps. And we build these things that not everybody can use obviously. (Laughter) We understand our limitations, and we build around it. But for some reason when it comes to the mental world, when we design things like healthcare and retirement and stockmarkets, we somehow forget the idea that we are limited. I think that if we understood our cognitive limitations in the same way that we understand our physical limitations, even though they don't stare us in the face in the same way, we could design a better world. And that, I think, is the hope of this thing.

　　試想我們建設(shè)物質(zhì)世界時(shí)， 我們了解自己的限制。 于是我們建設(shè)步驟。我們制造了這些東西， 雖然，很明顯并不是每個(gè)人都懂得使用。 (笑聲) 因?yàn)槲覀兠靼鬃约旱南拗疲?于是我們環(huán)繞著這些限制來(lái)建設(shè)世界。 可是為著某種緣故，到了思想世界， 當(dāng)我們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)醫(yī)療改革、退休計(jì)劃或股票市場(chǎng)等事情時(shí)， 不知怎地卻忘了自己的限制。 我想如果我們明白人類理性的限制， 正如我們明白生理上的限制一樣， 雖然它們并不像生理限制那么明顯， 那么我們便可以設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)更美好的世界。 我想這就是行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)帶個(gè)我們的希望。

　　Thank you very much.

　　謝謝大家。