威廉布萊克TED演講：銀行是如何被掏空的？
導(dǎo)語：銀行是一個(gè)看起來很復(fù)雜的系統(tǒng)，同時(shí)也是一個(gè)很容易出問題的系統(tǒng)，看看威廉布萊克TED演講銀行是如何被掏空的。
So today's top chef class is in how to rob a bank, and it's clear that the general public needs guidance, because the average bank robbery nets only 7,500 dollars. Rank amateurs who know nothing about how to cook the books.
今天的“頂級(jí)大廚”寓教于食，揭秘怎么搶銀行， 顯然，大眾對(duì)這個(gè)外行。 因?yàn)橐话愕慕俜藫屢淮毋y行， 平均只能搶到區(qū)區(qū)7500刀， 這是完全不懂做假帳的 業(yè)余會(huì)計(jì)的水平。
The folks who know, of course, run our largest banks, and in the last go-around, they cost us over 11 trillion dollars. That's what 11 trillion looks like. That's how many zeros? And cost us over 10 million jobs as well.
當(dāng)然，懂行的專業(yè)人士 全是大銀行的頭頭們， 上次他們出手， 我們損失11萬億刀。 11萬億看起來是醬紫的。 數(shù)數(shù)多少個(gè)0? 還讓我們損失1000萬個(gè)工作崗位。
So our task is to educate ourselves so that we can understand why we have these recurrent, intensifying financial crises, and how we can prevent them in the future. And the answer to that is that we have to stop epidemics of control fraud.
所以我們的當(dāng)務(wù)之急是 好好學(xué)習(xí)，長長見識(shí)，搞清楚 金融危機(jī)一再出現(xiàn) 并且愈演愈烈的原因， 以及未來如何防范。 答案就是 我們需要制止大面積的管理欺詐行為。 何為管理欺詐?
Control fraud is what happens when the people who control, typically a CEO, a seemingly legitimate entity, use it as a weapon to defraud. And these are the weapons of mass destruction in the financial world.
管理人員， 通常是CEO 在管理一個(gè)貌似合法的金融機(jī)構(gòu)時(shí)， 把這個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)當(dāng)成武器來使，搞詐騙。 這些算是金融界的 大規(guī)模殺傷性武器。
They also follow in finance a particular strategy, because the weapon of choice in finance is accounting, and there is a recipe for accounting control fraud, and how it occurs. And we discovered this recipe in quite an odd way that I'll come back to in a moment.
在金融領(lǐng)域，他們還采取一種特定的策略， 因?yàn)樗麄兯褂玫奈淦魇菚?huì)計(jì)(accounting)， 這是金融領(lǐng)域的不二之選。 會(huì)計(jì)管理欺詐行為及其發(fā)生 都有固定的“套路”。 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)這一點(diǎn) 也是不期而然。我稍后再談。
First ingredient in the recipe: grow like crazy; second, by making or buying really crappy loans, but loans that are made at a very high interest rate or yield; three, while employing extreme leverage -- that just means a lot of debt -- compared to your equity; and four, while providing only trivial loss reserves against the inevitable losses.
這一套路不可缺少的“原料”：首先是瘋狂地膨脹擴(kuò)張。 其次是放出或者購買“垃圾貸款”， 不過這種貸款的利率或者收益 非常之高。 第三，大肆利用金融杠桿， 也就是相對(duì)于資產(chǎn)而言不成比例 的大量債務(wù)。 第四，為應(yīng)對(duì)必然發(fā)生的壞賬 提供少之又少的準(zhǔn)備金。
If you follow those four simple steps, and any bank can follow them, then you are mathematically guaranteed to have three things occur. The first thing is you will report record bank profits -- not just high, record. Two, the CEO will immediately be made incredibly wealthy by modern executive compensation. And three, farther down the road, the bank will suffer catastrophic losses and will fail unless it is bailed out.
只要遵循這四個(gè)簡單的步驟， 任何銀行都做得到， 就會(huì)確定無疑地出現(xiàn)以下 三種情況。 第一，銀行的賬面利潤 將會(huì)是史無前例的高 不是一般的高，是史無前例的高。 第二，鑒于現(xiàn)代的高管薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)， CEO會(huì)一夜暴富。 第三，長此以往 銀行就會(huì)遭受巨額損失， 除非獲得救助，不然就將倒閉。
And that's a hint as to how we discovered this recipe, because we discovered it through an autopsy process. During the savings and loan debacle in 1984, we looked at every single failure, and we looked for common characteristics, and we discovered this recipe was common to each of these frauds.
因?yàn)槲覀儗?duì)整個(gè)流程進(jìn)行了“解剖”。 順藤摸瓜， 我們才發(fā)現(xiàn)了這個(gè)固定的套路。 1984年儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)期間， 我們仔細(xì)研究了每一個(gè)破產(chǎn)案例。 尋找其中的共同點(diǎn)， 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)這一套路在每個(gè)欺詐案例中 都存在。
In other words, a coroner could find these things because this is a fatal recipe that will destroy the banks as well as the economy. And it also turns out to be precisely what could have stopped this crisis, the one that cost us 11 trillion dollars just in the household sector, that cost us 10 million jobs, was the easiest financial crisis by far to have avoided completely if we had simply learned the lessons of epidemics of control fraud, particularly using this recipe.
換言之，“驗(yàn)尸官”能夠找到這些東西。 因?yàn)檫@是致命的“毒方”， 不僅會(huì)毀掉銀行， 也會(huì)毀掉我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)。 這也正是可以阻止 這場危機(jī)發(fā)生的東西， 這一危機(jī)僅在經(jīng)濟(jì)的私人部門就讓我們 損失11萬億， 丟掉1000萬個(gè)工作崗位， 如果我們能夠運(yùn)用這一固定套路 從大面積的管理欺詐行為中吸取教訓(xùn)， 我們就可以 輕而易舉地 避免這場危機(jī)的發(fā)生。
So let's go to this crisis, and the two huge epidemics of loan origination fraud that drove the crisis -- appraisal fraud and liar's loans -- and what we're going to see in looking at both of these is we got warnings that were incredibly early about these frauds. We got warnings that we could have taken advantage of easily, because back in the savings and loan debacle, we had figured out how to respond and prevent these crises. And three, the warnings were unambiguous. They were obvious that what was going on was an epidemic of accounting control fraud building up.
現(xiàn)在我們來看看這場危機(jī) 以及導(dǎo)致它發(fā)生的 兩種大面積借貸欺詐行為： 估價(jià)欺詐和欺騙性貸款。研究這兩者， 我們發(fā)現(xiàn)： 第一，對(duì)于這些欺詐行為，我們接到的預(yù)警信號(hào) 非常之早。 第二，我們可以輕而易舉地利用這些預(yù)警信號(hào)采取措施， 因?yàn)樵缭趦?chǔ)貸危機(jī)時(shí)期， 我們就知道了如何應(yīng)對(duì)， 從而避免危機(jī)的發(fā)生。 第三，這些預(yù)警信號(hào)確切不疑。 它們清楚地表明了 大面積的會(huì)計(jì)管理欺詐行為正在升級(jí)。
Let's take appraisal fraud first. This is simply where you inflate the value of the home that is being pledged as security for the loan.
我們先來看估價(jià)欺詐 簡單地說，估價(jià)欺詐就是 夸大用作貸款擔(dān)保的 房屋的價(jià)值。
In 2000, the year 2000, that is over a year before Enron fails, by the way, the honest appraisers got together a formal petition begging the federal government to act, and the industry to act, to stop this epidemic of appraisal fraud.
在2000年， 也就是安然破產(chǎn)一年多前， 有節(jié)操的估價(jià)師聚在一起，起草了一份正式的請(qǐng)?jiān)笗?要求聯(lián)邦政府采取措施， 要求行業(yè)自身采取措施， 制止這種大面積的估價(jià)欺詐行為。
And the appraisers explained how it was occurring, that banks were demanding that appraisers inflate the appraisal, and that if the appraisers refused to do so, they, the banks, would blacklist honest appraisers and refuse to use them.
這些估價(jià)師解釋問題是如何發(fā)生的： 銀行要求估價(jià)師弄虛作假 夸大估值， 一旦估價(jià)師拒絕配合， 銀行就把這些有節(jié)操的估價(jià)師 拉入黑名單， 不再雇傭他們。
Now, we've seen this before in the savings and loan debacle, and we know that this kind of fraud can only originate from the lenders, and that no honest lender would ever inflate the appraisal, because it's the great protection against loss.
在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)期間， 我們就遇到過這種情況， 我們知道這種欺詐行為的 罪魁禍?zhǔn)拙褪墙璺剑?有節(jié)操的借方絕對(duì)不會(huì) 為估值灌水， 因?yàn)榫芙^灌水才是防止損失的上策。
So this was an incredibly early warning, 2000. It was something we'd seen before, and it was completely unambiguous. This was an epidemic of accounting control fraud led by the banks.
所以說，預(yù)警信號(hào)早在2000年就已出現(xiàn)。 這是我們之前見到過， 并且確切不疑。 這就是銀行主導(dǎo)的 大面積會(huì)計(jì)管理欺詐行為。
What about liar's loans? Well, that warning actually comes earlier. The savings and loan debacle is basically the early 1980s through 1993, and in the midst of fighting that wave of accounting control fraud, in 1990, we found that a second front of fraud was being started.
欺騙性貸款又是神馬呢? 實(shí)際上，它的預(yù)警信號(hào)來得更早。 儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)基本上從1980年代早期開始 持續(xù)到1993年， 在打擊那波會(huì)計(jì)管理欺詐 的行動(dòng)中，我們?cè)?990年 發(fā)現(xiàn)欺詐行為出現(xiàn)了 第二波。
And like all good financial frauds in America, it began in Orange County, California. And we happened to be the regional regulators for it. And our examiners said, they are making loans without even checking what the borrower's income is.
果不其然，和美國的所有牛逼的金融欺詐行為一樣， 發(fā)源地又是加州橙縣。 我們剛好是當(dāng)?shù)氐谋O(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)。 我們的檢查人員說， 當(dāng)?shù)劂y行根本不核實(shí)借款人的收入情況 直接就發(fā)放借款。
This is insane, it has to lead to massive losses, and it only makes sense for entities engaged in these accounting control frauds.
這太沒底線了，必然會(huì)導(dǎo)致大規(guī)模損失，
And we said, yeah, you're absolutely right, and we drove those liar's loans out of the industry in 1990 and 1991, but we could only deal with the industry we had jurisdiction over, which was savings and loans, and so the biggest and the baddest of the frauds, Long Beach Savings, voluntarily gave up its federal savings and loan charter, gave up federal deposit insurance, converted to become a mortgage bank for the sole purpose of escaping our jurisdiction, and changed its name to Ameriquest, and became the most notorious of the liar's loans frauds early on, and to add to that, they deliberately predated upon minorities.
這種情況只可能是金融機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行了 會(huì)計(jì)管理欺詐行為。 我們對(duì)檢查人員說，沒錯(cuò)，你們說的對(duì)， 然后就在90、91年，我們?cè)阢y行業(yè)取締了 這些欺詐性的貸款。 但是，我們只能處理我們有權(quán) 管理的業(yè)務(wù)， 也就是儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款業(yè)務(wù)。 業(yè)內(nèi)最大最狡猾的詐騙銀行 “長灘儲(chǔ)蓄”主動(dòng)放棄 聯(lián)邦政府頒發(fā)的儲(chǔ)蓄和借貸執(zhí)照， 放棄聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)， 變身一家抵押銀行， 煞費(fèi)苦心，只為了逃避我們的監(jiān)管， “長灘儲(chǔ)蓄”后來更名為Ameriquest， 是早期欺騙性借貸欺詐行為中 最為臭名昭著的。 此外， 他們還故意欺騙美國的少數(shù)族裔。
So we knew again about this crisis. We'd seen it before. We'd stopped it before. We had incredibly early warnings of it, and it was absolutely unambiguous that no honest lender would make loans in this fashion.
所以這樣的詐騙性貸款危機(jī)也是我們所了解的， 我們之前見過，我們之前也阻止過。 我們接到的預(yù)警信號(hào)非常之早， 預(yù)警信號(hào)確切不疑： 有節(jié)操的借方絕不會(huì)這樣放款。
So let's take a look at the reaction of the industry and the regulators and the prosecutors to these clear early warnings that could have prevented the crisis.
我們來看看面對(duì)這些完全可以 阻止危機(jī)發(fā)生的清晰預(yù)警信號(hào)， 從行業(yè)自身、監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)到 檢調(diào)人員都做了些什么。
Start with the industry. The industry responded between 2003 and 2006 by increasing liar's loans by over 500 percent. These were the loans that hyperinflated the bubble and produced the economic crisis.
先看行業(yè)本身。 從2003年到2006年，金融行業(yè) 的欺騙性借貸業(yè)務(wù)增加了 5倍之多。 正是這些貸款 使泡沫飛速膨大， 造成了經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)。
By 2006, half of all the loans called subprime were also liar's loans. They're not mutually exclusive, it's just that together, they're the most toxic combination you can possibly imagine. By 2006, 40 percent of all the loans made that year, all the home loans made that year, were liar's loans, 40 percent.
截至2006年，半數(shù)被稱為次貸的借款， 同時(shí)也是欺騙性借貸。 這兩者并不互斥，而是交織在一起 共同構(gòu)成你所能想象出的 最壞組合。截至2006年，當(dāng)年發(fā)放的所有貸款， 當(dāng)年的所有房屋貸款中， 四成是欺騙性貸款。 高達(dá)四成啊，親。
And this is despite a warning from the industry's own antifraud experts that said that these loans were an open invitation to fraudsters, and that they had a fraud incidence of 90 percent, nine zero. In response to that, the industry first started calling these loans liar's loans, which lacks a certain subtlety, and second, massively increased them, and no government regulator ever required or encouraged any lender to make a liar's loan or anyone to purchase a liar's loan, and that explicitly includes Fannie and Freddie.
行業(yè)自身的反欺詐專家 曾經(jīng)警告， 這些貸款簡直是引狼入室， 詐騙率高達(dá)九成，百分之九十。 盡管有這些警告， 問題 還是發(fā)生了。 作為回應(yīng)，金融行業(yè) 首先開始稱呼這些貸款為欺騙性借貸， 聽上去不太悅耳。 其次，大幅增加這種貸款。 沒有任何政府監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu) 要求或者鼓勵(lì)任何借方 放出欺騙性貸款 要求或鼓勵(lì)任何人去購買欺騙性借貸， 這當(dāng)然也包括房利美和房地美。
This came from the lenders because of the fraud recipe.
由于欺詐的成因和模式， 借方難辭其咎。
What happened to appraisal fraud? It expanded remarkably as well. By 2007, when a survey of appraisers was done, 90 percent of appraisers reported that they had been subject to coercion from the lenders trying to get them to inflate an appraisal. In other words, both forms of fraud became absolutely endemic and normal, and this is what drove the bubble.
估價(jià)欺詐行為又是怎樣呢? 同樣膨脹得非常了得。 2007年，有份針對(duì)估價(jià)師的調(diào)查， 9成受訪的估價(jià)師表示， 他們受到借方的脅迫， 要求他們對(duì)估值進(jìn)行 灌水(夸大價(jià)值)。 換言之，兩種形式的欺詐行為 成為常態(tài)，瘋狂肆虐， 泡沫于是成型。
What happened in the governmental sector? Well, the government, as I told you, when we were the savings and loan regulators, we could only deal with our industry, and if people gave up their federal deposit insurance, we couldn't do anything to them.
政府部門的情況呢? 政府啊，不提也罷，說多了都是淚， 我們監(jiān)管儲(chǔ)貸的時(shí)候， 我們只能處理我們負(fù)責(zé)的行業(yè)， 如果借方放棄他們的聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)， 我們就將束手無策。
Congress, it may strike you as impossible, but actually did something intelligent in 1994, and passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act that gave the Fed, and only the Federal Reserve, the explicit, statutory authority to ban liar's loans by every lender, whether or not they had federal deposit insurance. So what did Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan, as chairs of the Fed, do when they got these warnings that these were massively fraudulent loans and that they were being sold to the secondary market?
國會(huì)，說起來你們可能不信， 在1994年實(shí)際上倒是干了點(diǎn)實(shí)事， 通過了《房屋所有權(quán)和股權(quán)保護(hù)法》， 法案賦權(quán)美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)，僅限美聯(lián)儲(chǔ) 明確的法律權(quán)力去取締來自任何借方的 欺騙性貸款業(yè)務(wù)， 無論這些借方有無聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)。 在接到這些預(yù)警信號(hào)： 這些大面積的欺詐性貸款 這些要轉(zhuǎn)售給次級(jí)市場的欺騙性貸款 作為美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席 到底做了些什么?
Remember, there's no fraud exorcist. Once it starts out a fraudulent loan, it can only be sold to the secondary market through more frauds, lying about the reps and warrantees, and then those people are going to produce mortgage-backed securities and exotic derivatives which are also going to be supposedly backed by those fraudulent loans. So the fraud is going to progress through the entire system, hyperinflate the bubble, produce a disaster. And remember, we had experience with this.
請(qǐng)記住，沒有神人能將這些欺詐行為消失。 欺騙性貸款一旦出現(xiàn)， 只能通過更多的欺詐行為， 如編造合約聲明和保證條款 把這一借款轉(zhuǎn)售給次級(jí)市場。 然后借方再推出 抵押貸款證券和 衍生產(chǎn)品， 而為這些產(chǎn)品進(jìn)行擔(dān)保的正是 欺騙性借款。 欺詐行為將貫穿 整個(gè)系統(tǒng)的始終， 使泡沫急劇膨脹，進(jìn)而造成災(zāi)難。 想想看，這事我們之前經(jīng)歷過。
We had seen significant losses, and we had experience of competent regulators in stopping it. Greenspan and Bernanke refused to use the authority under the statute to stop liar's loans.
我們?cè)馐芰司薮蟮膿p失， 職能監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)也有阻止危機(jī)出現(xiàn)的 先例。 但是格林斯潘和伯南克拒絕 使用法律賦予他們的權(quán)力來取締 欺騙性借貸。 首先，這完全是意識(shí)形態(tài)在作祟。 他們反對(duì)任何形式的監(jiān)管措施， 令人震驚和深惡痛絕。 但同時(shí)也是國際上放松監(jiān)管的競爭， 力爭下游。
And this was a matter first of dogma. They're just horrifically opposed to anything regulatory. But it is also the international competition in laxity, the race to the bottom between the United States and the United Kingdom, the city of London, in particular, and the city of London won that race to the bottom, but it meant that all regulation in the West was completely degraded in this stupid competition to be who could have the weakest regulation.
這場競爭在美國和英國，確切說是 倫敦之間展開， 倫敦獲勝，監(jiān)管最松。 這也意味著， 從這場看誰的監(jiān)控最松的愚蠢競爭中 可以看出在西方社會(huì)， 監(jiān)管措施是多么的不受待見。
So that was the regulatory response. What about the response of the prosecutors after the crisis, after 11 trillion dollars in losses, after 10 million jobs lost, a crisis in which the losses and the frauds were more than 70 times larger than the savings and loan debacle?
這就是監(jiān)管層面的反應(yīng)。 這場讓我們損失11萬億 1000萬個(gè)工作崗位， 損失和欺詐規(guī)模 超過儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī) 70倍的'危機(jī)之后， 檢調(diào)人員 又做了些什么呢?
Well, in the savings and loan debacle, our agency that regulated savings and loans, OTS, made over 30,000 criminal referrals, produced over 1,000 felony convictions just in cases designated as major, and that understates the degree of prioritization, because we worked with the FBI to create the list of the top 100 fraud schemes, the absolute worst of the worst, nationwide.
在儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)中， 負(fù)責(zé)儲(chǔ)貸監(jiān)管的機(jī)構(gòu)-儲(chǔ)蓄管理局 提出3萬起刑事訴訟， 1千人被判以重罪， 這還僅是大案要案方面， 而且還沒反映問題的嚴(yán)重性， 因?yàn)槲覀兏?lián)邦調(diào)查局?jǐn)y手， 開列了一個(gè)清單，上面是全國范圍內(nèi) 最沒節(jié)操最無底線的100種詐騙伎倆。
Roughly 300 savings and loans involved, roughly 600 senior officials. Virtually all of them were prosecuted. We had a 90 percent conviction rate. It's the greatest success against elite white collar criminals ever, and it was because of this understanding of control fraud and the accounting control fraud mechanism.
差不多300個(gè)儲(chǔ)貸機(jī)構(gòu)， 600個(gè)高級(jí)官員涉案。 幾乎全被起訴， 定罪率9成。 堪稱針對(duì)白領(lǐng)精英犯罪的 一場漂亮仗，史無前例， 原因無他，我們掌握了管理欺詐及 會(huì)計(jì)管理欺詐的內(nèi)幕 和伎倆。
Flash forward to the current crisis. The same agency, Office of Thrift Supervision, which was supposed to regulate many of the largest makers of liar's loans in the country, has made, even today -- it no longer exists, but as of a year ago, it had made zero criminal referrals.
再回到當(dāng)前的這場危機(jī)。 同一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)-儲(chǔ)蓄管理局， 本應(yīng)該監(jiān)管全國 欺騙性貸款禍?zhǔn)椎母鞔筱y行。 到今天，什么都沒做， 好像一切不曾發(fā)生過， 一年前，提出的 刑事訴訟案件數(shù)還是零。
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which is supposed to regulate the largest national banks, has made zero criminal referrals. The Fed appears to have made zero criminal referrals.
負(fù)責(zé)全國性大銀行 監(jiān)管任務(wù)的金融管理局， 提出的刑事訴訟案件數(shù)同樣為零。 美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)提出的刑事訴訟案件貌似 也是零。
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is smart enough to refuse to answer the question. Without any guidance from the regulators, there's no expertise in the FBI to investigate complex frauds. It isn't simply that they've had to reinvent the wheel of how to do these prosecutions; they've forgotten that the wheel exists, and therefore, we have zero prosecutions, and of course, zero convictions, of any of the elite bank frauds, the Wall Street types, that drove this crisis.
聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司更刁鉆，顧左右而言他， 根本不回答這個(gè)問題。 沒有監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的協(xié)助， 聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局在調(diào)查復(fù)雜的欺詐案件上 無能為力。 提出訴訟不是什么難事， 不過是舉手之勞，易如反掌。 只是他們忘了怎么舉， 忘了怎么反。 因而， 造成這場危機(jī)的 華爾街頂尖銀行詐騙犯們 沒有一個(gè)被起訴 沒有一個(gè)被定罪。
With no expertise coming from the regulators, the FBI formed what it calls a partnership with the Mortgage Bankers Association in 2007. The Mortgage Bankers Association is the trade association of the perps.
監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)不愿伸出援手， 聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局2007年與抵押貸款銀行家協(xié)會(huì) 攜起手來。 抵押貸款銀行家協(xié)會(huì) 是這些禍?zhǔn)椎男袠I(yè)組織。
And the Mortgage Bankers Association set out, it had the audacity and the success to con the FBI. It had created a supposed definition of mortgage fraud, in which, guess what, its members are always the victim and never the perpetrators. And the FBI has bought this hook, line, sinker, rod, reel and the boat they rode out in.
抵押貸款銀行家協(xié)會(huì) 出手了，他們不僅有能力也有動(dòng)機(jī) 去欺騙聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局。 抵押貸款銀行家協(xié)會(huì)為抵押欺詐行為 下了個(gè)定義，不出所料，按照這個(gè)定義， 這個(gè)協(xié)會(huì)的成員都是欺詐行為的受害者， 沒一個(gè)是欺詐行為的加害者。 聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局不疑有他 照單全收。
And so the FBI, under the leadership of an attorney general who is African-American and a president of the United States who is African-American, have adopted the Tea Party definition of the crisis, in which it is the first virgin crisis in history, conceived without sin in the executive ranks.
就這樣， 在一個(gè)非裔司法部長 和一個(gè)非裔美國總統(tǒng)的 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)之下，聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局完全相信了 茶黨對(duì)這場危機(jī)的說辭， 成了破天荒的“圣女生子案”， 高管層人人清白。
And it's those oh-so-clever hairdressers who were able to defraud the poor, pitiful banks, who lack any financial sophistication.
問題出在狡猾的臨時(shí)工身上， 他們?cè)谄垓_窮人，他們?cè)谄垓_對(duì)金融行業(yè)一無所知 的銀行業(yè)者。
It is the silliest story you can conceive of, and so they go and they prosecute the hairdressers, and they leave the banksters alone entirely. And so, while lions are roaming the campsite, the FBI is chasing mice.
這簡直是最奇葩的謊話， 然后他們把臨時(shí)工抓起來了， 銀行家們毫發(fā)未損。 就這樣，滿地西瓜 聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局卻在那里撿芝麻。
What do we need to do? What can we do in all of this? We need to change the perverse incentive structures that produce these recurrent epidemics of accounting control fraud that are driving our crises.
我們?cè)撛趺崔k? 面對(duì)這一切，我們能做什么? 我們需要改革不正常的激勵(lì)機(jī)制， 正是這種機(jī)制在催生一再出現(xiàn)的大面積 會(huì)計(jì)管理欺詐行為， 進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致危機(jī)的發(fā)生。
So we have to first get rid of the systemically dangerous institutions. These are the so-called too-big-to-fail institutions. We need to shrink them to the point, within the next five years, that they no longer pose a systemic risk.Right now, they are ticking time bombs that will cause a global crisis as soon as the next one fails -- not if, when.
第一，我們要排除這種具有 系統(tǒng)性危險(xiǎn)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)。 所謂“尾大不掉”的金融機(jī)構(gòu)。 在接下來的五年里， 我們要給它們大幅瘦身， 讓它們不再具有系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 現(xiàn)在，它們就是定時(shí)炸彈， 其中一個(gè)破產(chǎn)倒閉， 就會(huì)引發(fā)全球性危機(jī)。 而且問題還不是會(huì)不會(huì)倒，而是什么時(shí)候倒的問題。
Second thing we need to do is completely reform modern executive and professional compensation, which is what they use to suborn the appraisers. Remember, they were pressuring the appraisers through the compensation system, trying to produce what we call a Gresham's dynamic, in which bad ethics drives good ethics out of the marketplace. And they largely succeeded, which is how the fraud became endemic.
第二，我們要徹底改革 當(dāng)前的高管人員薪酬制度， 這也是他們用來脅迫估價(jià)師的工具和手段。 想想看，他們?cè)谕ㄟ^薪酬體系 向估價(jià)師施壓， 造成“劣幣驅(qū)逐良幣”的 格雷欣效應(yīng)， 市場上道德節(jié)操無人問津。 很大程度上，他們得逞了。 這就是為什么欺詐行為如此猖獗。
And the third thing that we need to do is deal with what we call the three D's: deregulation, desupervision, and the de facto decriminalization. Because we can make all three of these changes, and if we do so, we can dramatically reduce how often we have a crisis and how severe those crises are. That is not simply critical to our economy.
第三，我們要解決三“無”問題： 無規(guī)章制度、無有效監(jiān)管 出事后，無人擔(dān)責(zé)被繩之以法 的問題。 因?yàn)槲覀兛梢?從這三方面進(jìn)行改革，只要我們這樣做， 就能大幅降低危機(jī) 發(fā)生的頻率和危機(jī)發(fā)生后的 危害程度。 這不僅事關(guān)我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)。
You can see what these crises do to inequality and what they do to our democracy.
看看這些危機(jī)對(duì)貧富差距的影響， 對(duì)我們的民主制度的破壞。
They have produced crony capitalism, American-style, in which the largest financial institutions are the leading financial donors of both parties, and that's the reason why even after this crisis, 70 times larger than the savings and loan crisis, we have no meaningful reforms in any of the three areas that I've talked about, other than banning liar's loans, which is good, but that's just one form of ammunition for this fraud weapon. There are many forms of ammunition they can use.
危機(jī)產(chǎn)生了裙帶資本主義， 有美國特色的裙帶資本主義， 最大的金融機(jī)構(gòu)是 兩黨的最大金主。 這就是為什么 這場比儲(chǔ)貸危機(jī)嚴(yán)重 70倍的危機(jī)發(fā)生之后， 在我提到的三個(gè)方面依然沒有 任何實(shí)質(zhì)性的改革。 除了欺騙性貸款被取締， 這當(dāng)然是好事 但欺騙性貸款只是他們手中的 一種武器。 他們可用的武器還很多。
That's why we need to learn what the bankers have learned: the recipe for the best way to rob a bank, so that we can stop that recipe, because our legislators, who are dependent on political contributions, will not do it on their own.
這就是為什么我們需要 求教銀行家的地方： 搶銀行的最佳“秘方”， 這樣我們才能除掉它。 因?yàn)槲覀兊膰鴷?huì)議員 離不開政治獻(xiàn)金， 所以他們不會(huì)主動(dòng)來做這一切。
Thank you very much.
謝謝，多謝。
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